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Abstract
Nepal made signicant progress in removing monarchy and terrors of Maoists
in the last decade. It however lacks a stable solution of speedier economic
growth and development as the major political parties were not able to pro-
mulgate a constitution by Jan. 22, 2015 from the Constitution Assembly of
Nepal (CAN-II ) that was reelected on November 19, 2013 after the demise of
CAN-I on May 28, 2012. The multiparty structure that evolved in Nepal after
2006 revolution has not been able to focus on broader objectives of national
development, alleviation of poverty and speedier economic growth and design
of programmes suitable to multi-ethnic, multi-climatic and multi-cultural and
multi-linguistic inclusive frameworks. The constitution should be promulgated
with public consulation and consensus amog political paries as soon as possible.
Political parties should have a dynamic model model for the well decentralised
economy to update their beliefs on how to transform themselves to enhance
the wellbeing of all people in Nepal.
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1 Introduction
The Second Constituent Assembly of Nepal (CAN - II) aimed to promulgate a new
constitution for the federal republic of Nepal on Jan. 22, 2015 has been able to
circulate a draft constituion of Nepal for public consulatation in the middle of July
2015. It took a mighty devastating eathquake of April 25, 2015 killing nearly
8500 people and the massive collateral damages of houses and infrastructure across
the country to wake up political parties on the urgency to speed up for drafting a
constitution in Nepal. Parties were able to forge a consunsus among the four major
issues that caused the total failure of the rst CAN-I after four yearsof its tenure
on May 28, 2012 and that the NC, UML and UCPN very ine¤ective in delivering
their promises in ealry July 2015. It is increasingly likely the constitution of Nepal
will be promulagated by the CAN-II by the Autumn term of 2015.1 Four issues that
took so much attenstion were :
1. Restructuring of state: what should be the number of provinces and what
should be their names in the federal democratic system of Nepal?
2. Form of the governance: should it be a presidential or parliamentary form of
1When the members of the Maoists led coalition of opposition parties protested violently in the
assemby on Jan 22, 2015, it was clear their intention was not for a solution of the current problem
but to create chaos, tensions and disruptions. They still have not transformed themselves the basic
priciples of democracy but still cotinue to day-dreaming of a totalitarian system with their full
control of all parts of the government.
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the polity?
3. Election system: should representative of people be elected on the basis propor-
tional representation system or on the basis of the rst pass the post (FPTP)
election system? what should be timings of elections?
4. Justice system: what should be its form and how to insure its independence?
The deadlock created by "the mutual distrusts, lack of su¢ cient homework and
over concentration on negative criticism to disrupt any good initiative" seems to
have broken because of these ungent need for speedy economic recovery in the wake
of outpooring of international asssistance for the victims of the earthquake.
1.1 Realities
Nepal is a very heterogeneous country not only in terms of rugged topography and
ethnographic landscape with Mountains, Hills, Valleys and Tarai regions but dif-
ferent ethnic group settlements concentrated in di¤erent parts of the country. The
current structure of unied Nepal originated in "baise-chaubise rajya -(22 and 24
principalities)" before the unication of modern Nepal around 1769. Ethnic groups
such as Limbuwan, Bhojpuri-Mithila, Sherpa, Newa, Awadh, Magarat, Khas Arya,
Tharuhat, Dotel retain their identity and culture in specic regions. Should the new
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federal Nepal, be divided in provinces on the basis of enthnicity? Will it create new
problems or even lead to civil wars if di¤erent groups enter into conict in sharing
natural resources including rivers, forests and mountains?
Nepal should learn from the recent referendum in Scotland. The whole nation
can disintegrate if provinces want political independence. It will certainly be di¢ cult
for Nepal to achieve faster growth rate in the the rest of the 21st century with dis-
contents among sub-national groups. Division of provinces in federal Nepal may not
decentralise political and economic power as intended but will create extra problems
and tensions and misuse of scarce economic resources. While the decentralisation
aims to empower ordinary citizens in making decisions about their daily lives at lo-
cal level, there is a danger that they may be drawn into unnecessary conicts if such
divisions are not according to economic realities. Decentralisation has been successful
in many advanced countries. The model of decentralisation in the Western Europe,
particularly of Switzerland, shows how the decisions taken by elected assemblies in
provinces are far superior to those taken in the capital city. Decisions relating to the
provision of basic public services including education, health and provision of water,
electricity, gas, or developing literature, culture and traditions are more e¢ cient at
the local level within the broad parameters set by the central government. Local
elected assemblies are closer to the people.
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Howmany provinces should a federal Nepal have? Draft constitution has declared
creation of eight provinces. Smaller states cannot attract larger investments required
for speedier growth. Therefore it is better to be very cautious about the number of
states. It is important to understand that the size of markets become important
in reaping the scale and scope and reslising protability of investment projects and
administrative cost multiplies with the number of states. Number of states was one
of the most contentious issues among the political parties. Maoists party opting for
ten to eleven provinces and otehrs for ve to seven. Eight was the agreement on the
middle. Now the Federal Commission is to decide the boundaries and the names of
states within the six month of the promulgation of constituion. It would obviously
be better if the name and boundaries were decided before the promulgation of the
constitution.
Compare the size of states in India and provinces in China. Total population of
Nepal (now in about 30 million) about 14.6 percent of the Uttar Pradesh (204.2
million), 29.1 percent of Bihar (103 million) and 32.2 percent of the West Bengal
(93 million). Similarly Guandong (105.9 ml), Sandong (96.9 ml), Henan (94.1 ml)
and Sinchuan (85 ml) provinces of China have population more than three times of
entire Nepal (Tibet (3.1 ml ) is about 10 percent of Nepal). Dividing the markets
for goods and services and factors of production in Nepal in less than four million
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people does not seem economically prudent.
Why should the form of governance matter so much? Nepals neighbor India has
a very successful parliamentary system and China is doing very well economically
under the presidential system. The United States is a good example of presidential
system and the UK is a very successful parliamentary democracy. The separation of
power and functions among the legislative, executive and the judiciary is working well
in all of these democratic countries no matter under the presidential or parliamentary
system. Given the heterogeneity of population, it might be optimal to choose the
parliamentary democracy system in Nepal to decentralise power more than in a
presidential system. What matters for stability is clear jurisdictions among the
wings of the government in the centre and the provinces and villages in the regions
and local areas. Individuals should know their roles, responsibilities and limitations
clearly while being part of the nation.
1.1.1 Structure of the Parliament
As has been seen in the last two elections for CAN-I and CAN-II, electoral system
is to have combinations of the the rst pass the post (FPTP) and the proportional
election system. The parliament now consists of the House of Representatives (lower
house) and the National Assembly (upper house). Lower house is made of 275
members, of which 165 are directly elected from parliamentary constituencies on the
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FPTP basis and 110 members elected according to the proportional representation.
This number is about 35 percent above the 205 member parliament elected on May
12, 1991. Then the upper house small one with 45 members, ve from each of
eight provinces, another ve nominated by the president from specialists in various
elds to represent the national interest. This way each parliamentarian represents
about 1.1 lakh people. This may be a very a¤ordable parliament that can focus on
promulgating rules and regulations required to run the country particularly for the
speedier economic growth. It also provides su¢ cient numbers to the cabinet and
committees in the parliament at the central level and for committees at the local
bodies. The parliament should elect the most capable person as the president on a
non-partisan basis who is responsible for all people equally. He should have some
emergency and contingency powers to defend the state. This sort of arrangement
could work very well also in Nepal as it has worked so well in India.
1.1.2 Electoral system and Judiciary
There is little room for any controversy about the nature and functions of the election
commission. Its main function is to arrange smooth and fair election and declare
votes obtained by the candidates and select the winners. Its major duties include
maintaining the accuracy of the voters list and checking the credentials of candidates
claiming to represent the people, count votes and declare winners and losers on the
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basis of votes they are able to secure in the election.
The major function of a judiciary is to ensure the system of justice in the country.
Judges of the Supreme Court have plaid very important roles in defending democracy
in Nepal. From time to time since 1990 independent judiciary has protected the
democracy in Nepal when the political agreements were collapsing bringing the whole
country in the darkness. Government of bureaucrats was much more e¢ cient than
the elected one in conducting free and fair general election on November 19, 2013.
The parliament of Nepal was reinstated in 2006 by a decision of the Supreme Court;
the government led by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court conducted successful
election for CAN-II when the CAN-I was dissolved without any result. There should
be no doubt that judiciary should be independent and run by the professionals so
that it can break deadlocks when the parliament is hung and the political parties
cannot reach any decisions.
1.1.3 National consensus
Each of the above four issues did not become very complicated to reach into a
national agreement when the political parties became keen in promoting the welfare
and development of common people. Apparently di¤erent ideological positions of
these political parties that ere hind controversies and the power struggle were set
aside. Trust among each other and true will and sense of urgency for the national
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development from political parties after the earthquake was phenomenal. Every
person thinks that the rst priority had been to form a consensus of all parties for
the new constitution, Nepal could already have moved many mines in process of
growth and development. Agreement with Maoists avoided a fragmentary approach
of using 64.1 percent votes of NC and UML along with other minor parties to bypass
Maoists with 14.3 votes in CAN-II.
Consensus is the best solution as it can be expected to initiate an era of credible
and cooperative relations among the major political forces and to bring the ultimate
political stability required for the speedier growth process in Nepal. Not having a
consensus however is going to initiate a new round of political tensions or troubles
resulting in wastage of scarce national resources that could be employed for economic
growth. Despite being a hung assembly the current consensus of CAN-II allows
further renement on the theory of agreements to protect Nepal and to prevent is
being a failed state.
2 A theory of explanation of disaggreements
The major concern of the majority in Nepal is economic development. Millions
of young people need to go abroad for education and employment. Private sector
enterprises have not ourished and are unable to increase the rate of investment
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despite plenty of opportunities in basic industries such as hydro-energy, tourism,
education, health and communication. Nepal is among the least developed countries
in the world not because she does not have enough resources but because these are
not utilised properly. In the last three hundred years till 1950 it was completely
feudalistic state cut o¤ from the world. Some incremental steps for modern growth
started then but these were very minimal and beset by the political instability in
recent years. While dissolution of parliament in 1960 was due to conict of interest
between then king and popularly elected BP Koirala. Then another 30 years till
1990 were sort of direct rules by the king and his deputies under the extractive
system. Reinstatement of parliamentary system in 1990 was beginning the process
of inclusive growth that was terminated in 1960 but could not be stable and was
disrupted by Maoist conicts and wars along witgh the royal coup and take-over of
power in 2002. King dissolved the parliament in 2002 and imposed direct rule till he
was relinquished of all powers by 21 day popular protests in April 2006. This was
possible because of the joint alliance of NC, UML and Maoist parties.2
2The King relinquished all powers that he had snatched away from the people by reinstating
the House of Representatives (HOR) on the eve of 20th day of protest on April 25, 2006 organised
under the joint initiatives of all political parties including the Maoists. This historic revolution in
Nepal swept away the institution of monarchy for good. Then the CAN-I was elected with 601
members on May 28, 2008 and CAN-II on Nov 22, 2013.
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2.0.4 Emperors new clothes
Politicians are playing a sort of emperors new cloth game with the people in writing
and promulgating the constitution. As constitution sets the rules of formation of all
political and economic institutions it is obvious that no long term decisions can be
taken until the constitution is promulgated. The 12 point agreement for the complete
restoration of democracy in Nepal signed in November 2005 by three major parties
have not yet been fullled. Political parties were united to eliminate monarchy
but they have not agreed to share the political power. Why has this power game
been proven so tense and fruitless so far? Expectations of the people have been
forgotten and this long phase of transition has been very painful. What causes
this? While KP Bhattarai the PM of the interim government after the restoration
of multi-party democracy with a constitutional monarchy on 16 April, 1990 was able
to forge a consensus for a new constitution within a year terminating the partyless
Panchayat system that resulted from the royal coup of the parliamentary system
initiated in 1960, why has taken political parties to come into such an agreement?
Was it because Maoists did not exist at that time? How much this is due to changes
in the fundamentals and how much of it is due to ine¢ ciency of the politicians? This
is an interesting question.
First reason for a stalemate is lack of trust and credibility among members of
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the political parties. It is true that Nepal is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual country
with spread in Mountains, Hill and Tarai, surrounded by India in the East, South
and West and bordering to the Tibetan autonomous regions of China in the North.
Historically it is said that Nepal is a country of 4 classes and 36 ethnic groups. This
creates heterogeneity among population; for instance languages and cultural system
are di¤erent among Rai, Limbu Sherpa, Bahun, Chhetri, Newar, Yadav, Tharu,
Khas, Magar, Gurung and other ethnic groups. Then villages and valleys vary by
geographic locations. Mountains, Hills and Tarai and have di¤erent natural set-ups
and di¤erent requirements. Then each of the political parties have created a clientele
in each of these groups. No single solution applies to all these elements when the
political and economic interests are di¤erent. Given this situation the constitution
should set up a broad framework which is exible enough to accommodate the need
of each of these groups. Wasting time on the basis of pure ideological and unrealistic
paradigms does not lead to a solution. Why have not Buddhas teaching of peaceful
coexistence been applied at the national level? A solutions in such circumstances
should build on good things from each party or groups. Some compromise is essential
on the basis of coexistence and development of all within the given constraints. A
commitment to good institutions based on logics and rationality and more scientic
methods of decision making for the growth and development of the whole nation only
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can bring one to such outcome.
2.0.5 Beliefs: What do they care about?
There are N parties in the country indexed by i = 1; ::::; N . These parties represent
di¤erent constituencies. Each party i is interested in its own pay-o¤ xi (e.g the
number of ministries it should have under its command) which it computes using a
payo¤ function Ui that depend on strategies available to players and its information
set about the reactions of other players:
xi = Ui (S1; S2; ::::; Sn; a0; a1; a2; ::::; an) (1)
where S1; S2; ::::; Sn denote the strategies available to players, a0 is common knowl-
edge, and a1; a2; ::::; an denote the unknown characteristic of player i. Each player
knows which strategy is better for it given the strategy space of other players but
they have less information about the reactions of other players, aj. They make some
subjective estimates about others actions while calculating its payo¤ xi. This value
gives their reservation or threat point in bargaining. The agreement takes place when
actual bargaining and negotiation ends up giving zi and when this value is greater
than or equal to what the party i had expected, zi = xi. Negotiation breaks down
whenever zi 6 xi.
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Parties need to learn from each other to create a more realistic beliefs (bj) about
other players replacing unknown characteristics (a0; a1; a2; ::::; an) by more accurate
representation parameters (b0; b1; b2; ::::; bn)
xi = Li (S1; S2; ::::; Sn; b0; b1; b2; ::::; bn) (2)
Beliefs on these parameters could be formed on the basis of history, principles and
values of parties and key personalities of the party and studying their relations to
other players. Convergence on beliefs among all parties occurs when they understand
and trust each other. This gives credibility to the outcome of the game. Equilibrium
in such case is more certain and e¢ cient and generates greater payo¤ for parties and
welfare of the country.
max
1X
t=0
txi;t =
1X
t=0

tLi (S1;t; S2;t; ::::; Sn;t; b0;t; b1;t; b2;t; ::::; bn;t)
	
(3)
The evolution of the belief system should be consistent to a dynamic general equi-
librium model that shows trade-o¤s growth and redistribution in Nepal objectively
based on its structure of consumption, production, trade and the public policy. This
model need to be modied for the evolving economy within the federal democratic
system Nepal. No such e¤ort has been carried out before.
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3 Dynamic model
Let us consider a model of Nepal with urban and rural households located in various
economic regions of this country. Each of them allocate their life time income to
maximize utility by choosing an optimal path of consumption and saving. These
households provide factor services to producers of goods and services, who sell prod-
ucts both in domestic and foreign markets. The capital stock, determined overtime
by the volume of savings and investment, complements labor input. In central case,
we assume that labor force grows exogenously. Output expands along with increase
in labor and capital inputs, its level is consistent with the demand of consumers,
investors, the government and foreign sectors.
ConsumersIntertemporal Problem
In the model representative households located in urban and rural areas of the econ-
omy allocate lifetime income to maximize utility over an innite horizon; i.e.
max
1X
t=0
tU(Cht ) (4)
where  is the the discount factor, and it depends on the rate of time preference;
Cht is composite consumption; U is a time separable utility function. We choose a
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constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) CES utility function to represent U in (1).3
 = 1, U(Ct) = logCt.
U(Cht ) =
 
Cht
1    1
1   (5)
here 1= measures the elasticity of substitution between the present and future
consumption. The smaller is  the more slowly marginal utility falls as consumption
rises, so households are more willing to allow changes in consumption over time.
Thus smaller  implies higher elasticity of substitution between current and future
consumption or the higher degree of consumption smoothing and substitution over
time.
Each type of households faces an inter-temporal budget constraint which implies
that its the present value of consumption cannot exceed its present value of life time
income (wealth).
1X
t=0
R 1t PtC
h
t = WH
h (6)
where, R 1t =
t 1

s=0
1
1+rs
is a discount factor to convert future expenses in the
present value terms; rs represents the real interest on nancial assets; Pt is vectors
3When
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of relative prices, and Ct is composite consumption goods, which is composed of
sectoral consumption goods,
Ct = i = 1nC
hi
i;t (7)
where hi gives the share of spending on good i by household h. WHh is the life
time wealth of household h and is dened as:
WHh =
Jh0
1 + rc0
+
Jh1
(1 + rc0) (1 + r
c
1)
+ ::+
Jh2
hs (1 + r
c
0)
+ ::: =
1X
t=0
R 1t J
h
t (8)
where Jht is disposable household income in period t. It includes labor and capital
income plus transfers.
We combine equation (1) to (4) to form Lagrangian of consumers the inter-
temporal allocation problem in (5).
=h =
1X
t=0
(
1
1 + 
)t(
Cht
1    1
1   ) + :[
1X
t=0
R 1t PtC
h
t  WHht ] (9)
Here,  is the shadow price of income in terms of present value of utility, and  in
(1) is replaced by 1
1+
,where  is the rate of time preference. We derive consumption
function by taking rst order condition on (5):
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Ct+1
Ct
=

1 + rt
1 + 

Pt
Pt+1
 1

(10)
or using a steady state assumption on the growth rate
Ct+1 =

1 + rt
1 + 

Pt
Pt+1
 1

C0(1 + g)
t 1 (11)
Thus the consumption level at time t, in the steady state, is a function of growth
rate, the rate of interest and intertemporal prices of commodities. Consistency of
the intertemporal budget constraint implies that:
X
t
R 1t [C0 + 
1C0 + 
2C0 + :::::] = WH
h (12)
where

t = [
tR 1t
Pt
P0
]
1
 (13)
Economy wide savings is total of household savings,Sht , which in turn is the portion
of income not consumed :
St =
X
h
Sht =
X
h
Jht  
X
h
Cht (14)
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The consumption saving decisions are two sides of the same coin. Once we know
the level consumption we also know the level of savings. Saving like consumption is
inuenced by the rate of interest prevailing in the economy and the time preference of
individuals. The e¢ ciency in the nancial system can contribute to rise in the level
of saving, depending upon the value of , by inuencing the decision between the
current and future consumption and reducing the wedge between the cost of capital
to investors and gains received by the savers.
Savings of households are intermediated through the nancial institutions to in-
vestors, who use those savings to purchase investment goods from di¤erent sectors.
Like consumers investors in each of n production sectors solve an intertemporal prot
maximization problem. They combine goods produced in a set of n sectors to deliver
an unit of investment in sector j. Therefore, the unit cost of investment in sector j is
a weighted average of the prices of components of sector n goods used for investment
purpose. One unit of investment at period t produces once unit of capital stock in
period t+1:
IY
j;t
= P kj;t+1  
X
i
Pi;ta
I
i;j  0 (15)
Here
QI
j;t is prot from one unit of investment at period t, P
k
j;t+1 is the price
of capital in period t+1, and aIi;j is the investment coe¢ cient matrix. One unit of
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capital at the start of period 1 generates a rate of return( rkj;t) today and delivers
1- unit at the start of the subsequent period. The arbitrage condition in capital
accumulation implies that:
kY
j;t
= (1  )P kj;t+1 + rkj;t   P kj;t  0 (16)
Entering capital (K0) stock is transferred into initial capital stock for the various
sectors, Ki;0, according to a xed coe¢ cient transformation process. Once the initial
capital is allocated among di¤erent sectors, Ki;t , the law of motion of capital in a
sector is explained by the following equation.
Kj;t+1 = Ij;t + (1  K)Kj;t (17)
where,
Ij;t =
JX
j=1
aIi;jIj;t (18)
Net investment demand, Ii;t , in each sector is the sum of investment by origin.
The relationship given by aI
i;j;t
is called capital coe¢ cient matrix of the economy.
We assume that in the terminal period the investment in each sector grows at the
rate of the population so that economy can continue along the steady state growth
path even after the terminal period as given by the following equation.
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Ij;t = (g + K;j)Kj;t (19)
g =growth rate of the economy, which equals the growth rate of the labor force
in terms of e¢ ciency units, and K = rate of depreciation.
Holding aggregate stock of capital xed to the savings of households in the begin-
ning of each period, the objective of rms in jth sector of the economy is to maximize
the present value of prot subject to the constraints of production technology. Zero
prot for sector j written in dual form in terms of composite prices of commodities
and inputs is the following form (See appendix for details):
yj;t = [(
x
jPX
1+
j;t + (1  xj )PD1+j;t )]
1
1+   vjPV vj   (1  vj )
X
j
ai;jPi;t  0 (20)
The exact meaning of the symbols of the above prot function are following:
yj;t unit prot of activity in sector j
PXj;t price of exports
PDj;t price of domestic sales
PV vj price of value added per unit of output in activity j
Pi;t price of nal goods used as intermediate goods
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xj share parameter for exports in total production
vj share of costs paid to labor and capital
ai;j input output coe¢ cients.
This equation (20) is an unit prot function. The prot of operating these rms
are given by the di¤erences between the revenue from sales and the cost of supply.
The unit revenue function is constant elasticity transformation (CET) composite of
unit price of domestic sales and unit price of exports. The unit costs are divided
between value-added, i.e. payments to labor and capital, and the unit intermediate
input costs. In this model, the gross output in each sector is given by a nested
production function between the value added and the intermediate inputs.
Yj;t = min(Vj;t; ai;jYj;t) (21)
Where Yj;t is the output of sector j in period t, Vj;t is the value added part and
ai;j is the intermediate inputs per unit of gross output produced in sector j.
We use Shephards lemma to derive the demand for labor and capital from (20).
The demand for labor is:
Lj;t = Yj;t
@
QV
j;t
@PVj;t
@PVj;t
@PLj;t
(22)
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where Lj;tis a composite of rural (unskilled) and urban (skilled) labor. Equi-
librium in the labor market requires that demand for labor be equal to supply of
labor:
X
j
Lj;t
@L
@PLLCt
 Lt (23)
Ltin the above equations is a composite of urban and rural labor. The ratio of urban
to rural labor employed by rms mainly depends upon the ratio of urban to rural
wage rates.
The demand for capital in sector j, again by Shephards lemma is given by:
Kj;t = Yj;t
@
QV
j;t
@PVj;t
@PVj;t
@PKj;t
(24)
where Yj;t is activity level; PKj;tis price of capital PVj;t is price of value added.
In equilibrium the demand for capital is equal to its supply:
X
j
Kj;t = Kt (25)
Kt is the aggregate capital stock in the economy, which grows according to the
low of motion of capital stock as given by equation 13.
P
j
Kj;tis the total demand
for capital by various sectors of the economy.
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When an economy is repressed, the arbitrage condition implied by (9)
P kj;t+1 =
JX
j=1
Pj;ta
I
i;j (26)
does not exactly hold. There is additional distortionary cost  j;t on top of the
cost of materials required for per unit investment. The overall cost of investment is
rather given by:
P kj;t+1 = (1 +  j;t)
JX
j=1
Pj;ta
I
i;j (27)
where  j;t = per unit wedge between the return to saving and the cost of invest-
ment. P kj;t+1= present value price of sector j capital at the beginning of next period;
Pi;t= present value price of sector i commodity at period t.
In repressionary situation certain portion of saving dissipates in the process of
nancial intermediation. Therefore the total investment in the economy less than
the total savings i.e. the amount of savings net of intermediation costs. Moreover,
additional resources may be available by liquidating the real unproductive assets
(RA)of the households and rms.
c(St  RAt) = It (28)
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Here c is the proportion of saving available for investment purpose, or, 1-c being
the cost of nancial intermediation. In this model cost of nancial intermediation is
represented by the distortionary cost of repression.
3.0.6 Calibration to a Steady State
In the steady state all sectors of the economy grow at the same rate, g. The bench
mark rate of return is calibrated assuming the non-distorted economy being in the
steady state in the base year. Calibration of dynamic component follows the re-
lationship between the current and future prices of capital and investment goods.
Specically, investment produces one unit of capital stock in period 2 ( P k2 ) from
one unit of output in the period one, P I1 . The present value of one unit of capital in
period 2 is equal to (1  r)P k1 .
P I1 = 1 = P
k
2 = (1 + r)P
k
1 =) P k1 =
1
1  rP
k
2 (29)
Here 1-r is the discount rate between two periods, and is approximation to
1/(1+r).
P kt+1
P kt
= (1  r) (30)
One unit of capital at the beginning of period one earns a rate of return today, rk1and
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delivers 1- unit of capital for the start of the next period.
P k1 = r
k
1 + (1  ) (1  r)P k2 (31)
This relationship applies to all other periods included in the model. Using base
year prices equal to 1 to P k2 and P
k
1 by using relationship between P
k
2 and P
k
1 we get:
1
1  r = r
k
1 + (1  ) (32)
which gives the cost of capital to be equal to the rate interest plus the rate of
depreciation:
rk1 =
r
1  r +  (33)
. The base-year social accounting matrix (SAM) contains information on capital
income V1 and it is related to rate of return and capital stock, V1 = rk1K1. Now
substituting for rk1 between the steady state interest rate r and the parameters of the
model:
K1 =
V1
r
1 r + 
(34)
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Then substituting this value of K1 in I1 function the relationship between the
investment and capital earning component of value added may be expressed as:
I1
V1
=
g + 
r
1 r + 
(35)
If the ratio of investment and capital earning ( I1
V1
= 1) is equal to one then
g = r
1 r or r =
g
1+g
. When I1
V1
6= 1, then the key parameter to calibrate is the rate
of depreciation, which can be calculated using the relationship between the interest
rate, growth rate, depreciation and earning of capital as following :
j = g
Vj
Ij   Vj  
r
1  r
Ij
Ij   Vj (36)
In a repressionary regime the cost of capital is distorted by a repressionary com-
ponent of intermediation,  j. This can be expressed as:
rk1 =
rk1
1   j (37)
here rk1 is actual cost of capital, r
k
j is rate of interest in steady state, and  j is
distortionary element in the nancial market. The price of capital becomes
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P k1 = r
k
1 (1   j) + (1  ) (1  r)P k2 (38)
or the cost of capital
rk1 =
1
1   j

r
1  r + 

(39)
Now adjusting (26) to take account of distortions in the capital market :
I1
V1
=
g + 
r
1 r + 
(1   j) (40)
or
 j = 1 
rkj
 + g
Ij
Vj
(41)
Thus the spread between the true cost of capital rkj and the actual cost of capital
rk1depends upon the ratio of investment to capital and ratio of natural rate of interest
to depreciation plus the growth rate of the economy.
Government Budget and BOP Closures
In the core part of the model the governments budget is balanced in every period,
and, therefore government is not involved in intertemporal savings. This essentially
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implies all government expenditure is basically the government consumption.
The sources of revenue for the government are taxes on value added4, tari¤s
on imports, sales taxes, income taxes and capital taxes. Lump sum income taxes
are collected from total household income, and such income taxes are assumed to
grow at the rate of population growth rate. In addition there are other sources of
government revenue such as export taxes, taxes on tourism, revenue generated from
import-licensing and refund of excise taxes from India.
Government transfers its revenues to households and rms in the form of con-
sumption and production subsidies, and it also serves domestic and foreign debt. In
the core part of the model we assume all sorts of government non-transfer spending
to public consumption.
This is an open economy model. We follow standard Armington specication of
international trade in this model. For each tradable sectors constant elasticity of
transformation (CET) function denes relation between exports and domestic sup-
ply, and constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function explains relation between
domestic supply and imports in forming a composite good that goes to the utility
4From the scal year 1996/97 the government is adopting a value-added tax (VAT) system
to replace sales and excise taxes imposed on consumers and producers. Given the self-enforcing
mechanism of VAT against other indirect taxes are believed to reduce leakage of tax-revenues,
though its implementation seem challenging if one considers illiteracy of 67 percent of population in
the country. In ideal conditions revenue generated from VAT and taxes on the nal product would
be the same.
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function of the households. We use two level nests in trade to take account of dif-
ferent natures of trade relations between India and rest of the world (ROW). More
detailed discussion of trade specication is available elsewhere (see Bhattarai (1997,
2007) and also the appendix of this paper).
We consider two rules of BOP closure. In the rst case no foreign borrowing is
allowed; imports need to be paid by exports5 :In the second case intertemporal bor-
rowing and lending is permitted. It is presented in the form of CAPFLOW scenario
in the next section:The elasticities of substitution between domestic and imported
products in consumption and the elasticity of transformation between domestic sales
and foreign sales are taken based on sensitivity analyses.
Finally, the market clearing condition for goods market is given by:
Aj;t = Cj;t +
12X
j=1
ai;jYj;t +Gj;t +
12X
j=1
aIi;jIj;t +DSTj;t + TDj;t (42)
here Aj;tis total supply in the economy in a sector j should be equal to sum
of various components of demand as given on the right hand side, i.e. the con-
sumption of households: Cj;t =
P
h
Cj;h;t, intermediate demands:
12P
j=1
ai;jYj;t; , gov-
ernment demand: Gj;t, investment demand: Ij;t =
P
j
ai;jIj;;t, inventory demand:
5 . In the model number of sectors trading with placecountry-regionIndia and rest of the world
are seven and eight respectively.
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DSTj;t = DSTRj;t  Yj;t, and demand by tourists: TDst ; for simplicity we assume
that demand by tourists grows at the rate of growth of the economy.
Denition of a competitive equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a set of sequences of prices of composite commodities,
Pi;t; prices of domestic goods sold in domestic markets, PDi;t; prices of exported
commodities, PXi;t ; prices of capital goods , P kj;t ; prices of terminal capital ,
PTKj;t; wage rates for each categories of labor, wh;t; prices of government services,
PGt; prices of provisions for tourism, PTt; value of transfers to the households,
PRt; prices of consumption, PUt; welfare index, PWt; rental rate of capital for each
sector, rk1 : R+ !R, and sequences of gross output, Yi;t; total supply of commodities,
Ai;t; sectoral capital stock, Ki;t; sectoral investment, Ii;t; exports, Xi;t; government
services, GOVt; level of household utility from consumption, Ut; and total welfare,
W such that given these prices and commodities
1. households solve intertemporal utility maximization problems subject to life
time income constraints,
2. investors solve intertemporal prot maximization problem subject to arbitrage
conditions in capital markets
3. producers solve their prot maximization problem subject to technology and
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resource constraints
4. markets for goods and services, labor , capital clear
5. government account constraints are satised,
6. balance of payments condition is fullled
7. nancial markets are in equilibrium
In this equilibrium, consumers have perfect foresight, capital accumulation is
consistent with households optimization, income and expenditure balance over the
life period. An agent is doing the best he can in light of actions taken by others
and actions taken together are technically feasible. This ensures the compatibility
of plans of individuals or correspondence between consumerspreferences and rms
technology.
There are mainly two limitations of this model. First, analytical solution of this
model is very complex and unrewarding. We rely on numerical methods that generate
a set of relative prices consistent with the equilibrium. Absolute prices do not matter
in general equilibrium models, it generates the same equilibrium even if all prices are
multiplied by a constant. For analyses of model results we basically compare ratios
of prices in terms of a numeraire in benchmark and counter-factual scenarios, not
the absolute di¤erences in prices.
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Second, the model presented here does not contain any adjustment costs or penalties.
The role of dynamics in such a model is not to show the pattern of adjustment, but
to track the prices of commodities with a multiperiod character, e.g. the capital
stock. The model is suitable to study the impact of a certain policy that changes the
steady state of the model and thus the growth and welfare of the households over a
model horizon.
In spite of these limitations the model is capable of generating results that are
interesting from a point of view of a policy maker. We use a welfare index as the
criterion for making the best policy choice from the various options available to a
policy maker.
Measure of Welfare
General equilibrium solutions are used to compute equivalent or compensating vari-
ations in consumer welfare from given changes in policy regimes. In this model the
overall welfare is given by sum of utility over periods measured in terms of prices of
composite consumption.
UW h =
1X
t
PUht U
h
t (43)
Here UW h is a measure of welfare to household h for the period of model horizon,
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PUht is the price of composite consumption in period t, and U
h
t is the utility to a
household from consumption of goods and services in the economy.
We use welfare measures in order to quantify the impacts of various policy measures.
A policy experiment that has greater value of UW h is more desirable than the one
with lower one.
4 Interactions of model with beliefs
The process of negotiations among various parties should be based objectively in an
economic model as above as it is possible to compute the optimal level of saving,
investment, capital formation and growth objectively in such set up. There is little
room for illusions, misunderstanding and distrust when the negotiations are based
on such models:
max
1X
t=0
txi;t =
1X
t=0

tLi (S1;t; S2;t; ::::; Sn;t; b0;t; b1;t; b2;t; ::::; bn;t;Mt)
	
(44)
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5 Composition of Constituent Assemblies of Nepal 2013 com-
pared to 2008
People are principal and MPs are their agents in the principal agent game. When
the rst CAN dissolved without promulgating a constitution of Nepal on May 28,
2012 people changed their beliefs about the true intention and commitment of the
UCPN (Maoists) towards development and their ability to promulgate a constitution
of Nepal. They rened their beliefs about the Nepali Congress and UML and other
Tarai based parties. This change is reected in the structure of the second CAN
that was elected on November 19, 2013. Still this was a hung CAN as before but the
share of the Nepali Congress increased to 33.9 from 19.3 percents and that of UML
increased to 30.4 from 18.0 percents. The share of UCPN (Maoist) reduced to 14
from 38.1 percents. The UCPN (M) became weak and is no longer in a position of
dreaming a totalitarian system in Nepal. After this verdict parties have committed
to promulgate the constitution of Nepal by Jan 22, 2015. Committees in the CAN-II
have been able to resolve many disputes but still have not converged in their opinions
regarding the structure of governance or that of federal system till the end of October
2014.
Still leaders of Nepal seem to be confused in understanding the basic fact that the
gains from the commitment and cooperation should be much larger than of nonco-
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Table 1: Members of First Constituent Assembly by Political Parties in Nepal
Total Maoist NC UML MPRF TMLP Others
Total 601 229 116 108 53 21 74
FPTP 240 120 38 33 29 9 11
Proportional 335 100 73 70 22 11 59
Nomination 26 9 5 5 2 1 5
Percentage 100% 38.1% 19.3% 18.0% 8.8% 3.5% 12.3%
Source: Constituent Assembly of Nepal (CAN).
Table 2: Members of Second Constituent Assembly by Political Parties in Nepal
Total NC UML Maoist MPRF RPP Others
Total 601 204 183 84 15 11 103
FPTP 240 105 91 26 4 0 14
Proportional 335 91 84 54 10 10 86
Nomination 26 8 8 4 (0)1 1 (0)3
Percentage 100% 33.9% 30.4% 14.0% 2.5% 1.8% 17.1%
Source: Constituent Assembly of Nepal (CAN).
operation to form coalition or in releasing that the benets of dynamic optimisation
are far greater than zero sum game being played at the moment. It is important to
rethink about the true and realistic social welfare function such as W (Y; S) where
Y denotes the level of aggregate economic activities and its growth rates and S the
stability of the system, can be one way to redirect resources wasted in the process
of unsuccessful coalition formation to bring more e¢ cient and Pareto optimal solu-
tion. Reinvigorate the spirits of April 2006 Revolution. It is important to think
why Nepals per capita income is one third of India and about 12 percent of China
though it had similar per capita income with them till 1980. Political instability in
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the last two decades has been very costly to Nepal. These could have been decades of
spectacular growth but turned into the decades of disaster. There cannot be bigger
irony than this in the context of Nepal and cooperative strategies of each political
party is the only way to sort out this problem. Credibility, respect and commitment
only can make this happen.
6 Conclusion
Nepal made signicant progress in removing monarchy and terrors of Maoists in
the last decade. It however lacks a stable solution of speedier economic growth and
development as the major political parties were not able to promulgate a constitution
by Jan. 22, 2015 from the Constitution Assembly of Nepal (CAN-II ) that was
reelected on November 19, 2013 after the demise of CAN-I a constitution on May
28, 2012. The multiparty structure that evolved in Nepal after 2006 revolution has
not been able to focus on broader objectives of national development, alleviation of
poverty and speedier economic growth and design of programmes suitable to multi-
ethnic, multi-climatic and multi-cultural and multi-linguistic inclusive frameworks as
Maoists have not been able to transform themselves adopting democratic norms. NC
and UML should move ahead with two third majority to promulgate a constitution
as soon as possible. Political parties particularly the Maoists should have a model to
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update their beliefs based on dynamic model of decentralised economy rather than
sawing seeds of their own destruction.
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